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The Two Bodies of Hobbes and Rousseau

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ABSTRACT

Hobbes and Rousseau relied heavily upon the time-worn metaphor of the body politic to describe and explain their respective political visions. But while Rousseau's use of the metaphor is largely accepted by scholars as a congruous and illuminating extension of his political thought, Hobbes's use of it is regarded as an instance of mere rhetoric, which is philosophically incompatible with his broader mechanistic voluntarism. This article questions the interpretive double-standard applied to Hobbes's and Rousseau's work and shows how their iterations of the body motif are remarkably similar in aesthetic structure, in rhetorical intent, and in the performative role they play within Hobbes's and Rousseau's political design. Certain features of Hobbes's thought that scholars have judged to be incompatible with his body metaphor—such as voluntarist contract and the rival metaphor of the machine—were also employed by Rousseau, and are easily reconciled. The body metaphor was enormously important to both Hobbes and Rousseau for its rhetorical ability to exhort against factionalism, enjoin organic cohesion, and emphasize the existential indispensability of political sovereignty. These parallels suggest that their political aims are comparable, and that Hobbes's reputation as a mechanistic voluntarist deserves review.

KEYWORDS

Hobbes; Rousseau; embodiment; machine; individualism; collectivism; consent; nature; organicism

In the political imagination of ancient and medieval times, no metaphor was used more frequently than that of the so-called "body politic." Whether elaborated with physiological specificity, as in the works of John of Salisbury and Christine de Pizan,[1] or invoked as a vaguely organic ideal, as in the thought of Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero,[2] the body metaphor served as a rhetorical shorthand for certain aspirations and assumptions about society. Chief among them was the belief that human society is natural in both its origin and essence. Primitive individuals were imagined joining together spontaneously, through instinct rather than rational deliberation or formal contract. Each individual's allegedly innate differences and limitations, which necessitated their collective union in the first place, became the primary means by which that civil union could be preserved, with a degree of cohesion and vitality typically reserved for biological organisms. The body politic metaphor wordlessly expressed all these beliefs about society and offered a symbolic norm against which social deviations could be denounced as existential threats to the "health" of the whole.

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During the early modern era, however, this ubiquitous metaphor began to quietly disappear from social and political commentaries, and its waning coincided with a new surge of interest in private freedoms and rights.[3] The traditional understanding of political governance as a natural and divine right was challenged and largely supplanted by voluntarist representation: a temporary and limited governance established through formal contract. This revision of political relationships seemed to encourage, even if it did not immediately effect, a commensurate revision of all other social relationships by which citizens could imagine themselves less as an indivisible "people" than an aggregation of "persons," loosely connected through various legal and political agreements. Many anti-modern theorists who critique this vision of society have argued that it advances individual rights and liberties against collective goods, and fixates on technological progress and economic exchange at the expense of social solidarity and wellbeing.[4] According to this perspective, declining interest in organic rhetoric during the early-modern era should be regarded as the harbinger of an antithetical liberal world-view that would gradually replace the long-standing metaphor of society as a natural human body with the grim conceit of an artificial machine.[5]

Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) has lately been regarded as the original architect of this individualist social mindset, although it is not entirely clear why. To be sure, Hobbes persistently rejected the older organicist theories of society, and instead characterized society as the product of a voluntarist contract, authorized under duress. He also seemed to imply or insinuate a crudely mechanist view of society by defining organic life itself as "matter in motion": a description that he also extended to inventions such as clocks and institutions such as the commonwealth. These considerations are easily contrasted with others, however. Hobbes's most evocative descriptions of humans as detached entities occur *pre*-society, not *post*-society, and the emergence of a "people" out of the mere "multitude" suggests that the latter category is at least eclipsed, if not abolished, in the social contract. Moreover, Hobbes strongly preferred the metaphor of the body over that of the machine when describing the essence of society, and he employed the old organic conceit in the usual, conventional manner, to portray and promote social solidarity. These aspects of Hobbes's work have been largely overlooked or dismissed by scholars who consistently privilege the mechanist evidence, however meager, over the organicist claims, however prominent.

Even more curiously, Jean-Jacques Rousseau's (1712–1778) work is usually interpreted in the opposite manner. Although he shared many of the same social concerns and interests as Hobbes, and utilized the machine metaphor far more frequently, Rousseau's organicist claims about society are consistently privileged over his mechanist rhetoric.[6] It seems strange, given the similarities in Hobbes's and Rousseau's rhetorical strategies and aims, that one should be pigeonholed as a mechanistic individualist[7]—and in fact considered the original *architect* of this perspective[8]—while the other is treated with nuance and regarded to be some sort of moral collectivist.[9] This article questions the double-standard, and investigates why scholars have handled the two "bodies" of Hobbes and Rousseau so differently. Special scrutiny is due to Otto von Gierke (1841–1921), who seems to have been one of the first to suggest that the body metaphor has no place in Hobbes's political vision—which Gierke described as "individualist, through and through."[10] This interpretation was then furthered by Gierke's German acolyte Ferdinand Tönnies,[11] and by his English promoters, Leslie Stephen, William Maitland,

and Ernest Barker.[12] Not long after, assertions about Hobbes's individualism began to surface in other prominent works, such as those by Leo Strauss, Michael Oakeshott, and C. B. Macpherson,[13] and eventually spread into mainline political theory, where it has now become fairly standard to equate Hobbes with individualism, and individualism with Hobbes.

This assessment rests almost entirely upon Gierke's original claim: that the "social contract" tradition is inherently incompatible with social collectivism, just as the machine metaphor contradicts that of the body. Thus the inclusion of both themes—social contract and machine—within Hobbes's work ably adduces that he was neither a collectivist nor an organicist, despite evidence to the contrary. This article questions the logic of that conclusion by showing Gierke's original claim to be false: the social contract tradition is completely compatible with collectivism, just as the machine metaphor is easily reconciled with that of the body, and Rousseau's work demonstrates this. But before we examine these claims, it may be useful to remind ourselves of the organicist mentality invoked by the ancient metaphor of the "body politic," to distinguish what it meant from what it did not mean, and to register its transformation under the influence of Christianity. Clarifying these themes may help us understand why Hobbes and Rousseau clung to the body motif well into the early modern era, long past the point it was considered relevant or ideal.

The Body Politic

Organicism was so universally assumed in the ancient world that philosophers must have thought it unnecessary to explain or defend it in any systematic manner. Neither Plato nor Aristotle explicitly used the expression "body politic," although the organic mentality is prominent throughout their political works, from the "sickness" and "health" of Plato's republic to the structure of power in Aristotle's polis, which is like "the rule of the soul over the body."[14] By the first century BC, Cicero could casually refer to the "body politic" (*corpus rei publicae*) without needing much in the way of preliminary explanation.[15] All of them claimed that society was similar to a living organism due to its origin, which was "natural," operating under a biological mandate. "A city comes to be," wrote Plato, "because none of us is self-sufficient, but we all need many things."[16] Humans are "incapable of existing without each other," observed Aristotle, "and this is not a matter of choice, but is due to a natural urge, which exists in the other animals too and in plants."[17] The ineluctable tyranny of this urge led humans to associate spontaneously as they encountered each other, requiring neither contract nor deliberation but only a keen sense of their reciprocal needs. And after their immediate physical needs had been met, humans remained in society at the behest of yet another mandate—this time moral—for the satisfaction of all other social, intellectual, and spiritual needs.[18] In both ways, society was regarded as a teleological process, determined by nature itself,[19] and carried out through necessary urges and needs implanted in humans without their knowledge or consent.

Moreover, these origins aside, society could be compared to a living organism simply because of the interdependent relationship of its constitutive components. Aristotle invited his readers to use the scientific method and deconstruct the state into simple parts, much as one would isolate elements of a chemical compound or dissect an animal's organs.[20] This method made sense in that society was "made up of unlike parts" similar to

those within a living body, connected to each other by a "reciprocal equivalence" and symbiosis, all working toward the existential benefit of the whole. "The part and the whole, the soul and the body, have identical interests," he wrote.[21] But these identical interests were not to be confused with identical *functions* toward those ends. Just as the "soul" of the body was believed by Aristotle and Plato to perform a more elevated and indispensable role than other parts or organs, certain roles in society were regarded as more preeminent in virtue, and therefore deserving of higher social standing and greater authority over all other members of the polis.[22] Biological patterns of organization were frequently marshalled as evidence that hierarchy is the very decree of nature, to which humans should and in fact usually *do* conform—reinforcing yet again the fundamentally organic quality of political society. Altogether, these convictions make up what is now understood as the ancient organicist tradition. To many modern minds, it seems quaint, facile, and idealistic, overly reliant upon unproven claims about "nature," and incapable of capturing or explaining the messy range of human behavior and agency encountered in real life. If the ancients said no more about the expression of organicism in society, this assessment would be fully justified.

But in fact, the ancients gave many indications that they were aware of the limitations of their organicist beliefs, and openly admitted that nature's mandate for society was a pure ideal, imperfectly realized even in the most exemplary communities, and almost never pursued with the spontaneous ease that the theory implied. Aristotle, whose confidence in nature seemed most unshakeable, admitted that humans were unique in their ability to transgress against it.[23] He appealed to the coercive power of the polis (once formed) to prosecute the conspicuous "savagery" within it, and even suggested that the very existence of the polis might depend upon the strenuous efforts of a visionary founder rather than an impromptu convergence of humans, all effortlessly obeying the dictates of nature within them. "A social instinct is implanted in all men by nature," he stated, "and yet he who first founded the state was the greatest of benefactors. For man, when perfected, is the best of animals, but when separated from law and justice, he is the worst of all."[24] Plato's depictions of human dysfunction are even more disturbing. He diagnosed society with sicknesses so intractable and chronic that its long-term viability seemed unlikely.[25] Brave rescue missions undertaken by the healthiest on behalf of the most ill—such as the one memorialized in the cave analogy, and those performed by Socrates himself in Athens—almost always ended disastrously, and ultimately Plato suggested that it might be easier to rebuild society from scratch, ideally with young children.[26] Attempting to reestablish it with grown adults would likely require long persuasion and propaganda sessions led by skilled elites to trick everyone into harmonious interdependence.[27] The powerful call of nature seems ineffectual in these passages, and the creation of "organic" society is revealed to be largely manmade.

Cicero took this theme still further, describing an unfortunate era before human society in which "men wandered at large in the fields like animals," indulging their baser appetites and eschewing the use or development of reason. But at some point, one enterprising individual broke from precedent and carefully considered the untapped potential. "He assembled and gathered them all" in order to introduce and propose the possibility of human society. "They cried out against it at first because of its novelty," Cicero wrote, but "when through reason and eloquence they had listened with greater attention, he transformed them from wild savages into a kind and gentle

folk." Cicero expressed incredulity that society could have originated otherwise, because it did not seem possible to him "that a mute and voiceless wisdom could have turned men suddenly from their habits and introduced them to different patterns of life." He asked:

> How could it have been brought to pass that men should learn to keep faith and observe justice and become accustomed to obey others voluntarily and believe not only that they must work for the common good but even sacrifice life itself, unless men had been able by eloquence to persuade their fellows of the truth of what they had discovered by reason? Certainly only a speech at the same time powerful and entrancing could have induced one who had great physical strength to submit to justice without violence.[28]

Cicero's emphasis here upon rational deliberation and formal consent[29] may seem surprising given his staunch insistence elsewhere that human society was natural, instinctual, and organic, but it reveals the willingness of the ancients to complicate their organicist narrative, especially when exploring the depths of human dysfunction. His own personal bête noire was human egoism, which he considered to be "more contrary to Nature than death or poverty or pain." He urged, "This ought to be the chief end of all men: to make the interest of each individual and of the whole body politic identical."[30] That Cicero found it necessary to remind his readers of their human end and exhort them to assiduously pursue it shows how little convinced he was of an effortless result. But since he, Plato, and Aristotle persisted in regarding society as something natural and organic, while accepting (perhaps expecting) that rigorous education, thoughtful institutions, religious propaganda, and coercive laws might be indispensable toward creating and sustaining it, we should assume that the ancients cared more about the actual conformity to nature's directives than the process by which it was achieved.

Early Christianity adopted many of these tropes but critiqued and altered them as well. Saint Augustine (AD 354–430) upbraided Cicero for underestimating human depravity and advocating a degree of social harmony that was likely impossible. Augustine did not deny that humanity's nature was initially one of sociability and harmony. He cited the scriptural account of Eve's creation from Adam's rib as evidence of God's intention to "ensure unity of fellowship" among all humans, "bound to one another not only by their similar nature but also by their feeling of kinship."[31] Unfortunately Adam's sin immediately destroyed this disposition and introduced the very opposite urge within himself and his progeny, ensuring that "even beasts without a rational will, such as arose in teeming numbers from the waters and the lands, would live more securely and peaceably with their own kind than men, whose race was propagated from one individual for the purpose of inspiring harmony. For never did lions or dragons wage such wars with one another as men have waged."[32] Augustine denounced this tendency as "contrary to nature" when comparing it to humanity's original orientation, which remained latent though "vitiated" within.[33] But when describing the relentlessness of sin, which seemed to drive humans ineluctably toward their own destruction,[34] he would often imply that humanity was under the sway of an entirely new nature, with no memory of the original one, and far less the power to recover it. He brusquely dismissed the confidence of the ancients, however tempered, and declared their alleged social harmony to be false and fraudulent, like a cheap artistic imitation,[35] or a body without a soul.[36] "If in humankind there is no justice," he reasoned, "then there is not that common sense of right which transforms

a multitude of men into a people, whose estate has been said [by Cicero] to constitute a state."[37] Despite all their best efforts,[38] they remain nothing more than "a promiscuous multitude unworthy of the name people."[39]

Augustine's profound skepticism of ancient organicism did not prevent him from embracing the mentality, however, and claiming it for Christianity. The perceived failure of "pagan" philosophy to adequately diagnose or ameliorate the human condition only amplified the urgency of the crisis and the need for a lasting solution—which Augustine introduced in language shamelessly borrowed from the very tradition under attack. Augustine described the Christian church community as "one body (*unum corpus*)" of many members, well-ordered and proportioned, with the harmony exhibited by any other healthy organism, and the "rhythm of relationships, the *harmonia*, as the Greeks would say, whereby the whole body, inside and out, can be looked upon as a kind of organ with a music all its own."[40] Within this state, "There exists no love of will that is personal or private, but a love that rejoices in a common and unchangeable good, and makes a single mind out of many. . . . No one who is lower will envy one who is higher, and no one will wish for the place he has not received, any more than in our body, the finger wishes to be an eye."[41]

Augustine drew these organic metaphors, not only from the ancient tradition but also from the epistles of Paul, in which the Christian church was frequently described as "one body," made up of many members, "joined and knit together by what every joint supplies, according to the effective working by which every part does its share."[42] Paul used the conceit to celebrate the community's diversity—in ethnicity, class, social status, and rank or role within the church itself—while also emphasizing the symbiotic unity that bestowed upon each participating individual a commensurate value and indispensability. "The body is not one but many," he explained. "If they were all one member, where would the body be? The eye cannot say to the hand, 'I have no need of you,' nor again the head to the feet, 'I have no need of you'."[43] These organic allusions were often folded into larger exhortations about unity and harmony, in which Paul would urge each Christian "not to think more highly of himself than he ought," nor provoke "schism in the body," but to live peaceably, content in the mutuality of their respective contributions and experiences. "For if one member suffers, all the members suffer with it; or if one member is honored, all the members rejoice with it."[44] Paul's social vision was virtually indistinguishable from that of the ancients, and Christian theologians after him (such as Augustine, John of Salisbury, and Aquinas), explicitly acknowledged and accepted that the pre-Christian desideratum of society was correct,[45] although not in an unqualified sense.

Yet Christianity refused to uphold certain tenets of organicism set forth by the ancients, some having to do with the relationship of parts within society, and others concerning its very origin. For instance, the assumption that social unity could be initiated or achieved through "nature" was unceremoniously overturned. Humans in the corrupt state described by Christianity had access to two competing natures: one that was positive but silent and ineffectual, and one that was active and dominant but defunct. Neither could be relied upon to motivate genuine or lasting fellowship among humans—Paul and Augustine often reiterated this point polemically, as if to exaggerate the impasse and intensify anxieties over the fate of humanity.[46] Ultimately organic harmony was still possible, but only if introduced *un*-naturally, through divine intervention: "In the fall of the first man, a well-created natural state was impaired, and it can be

restored *only by its creator*," Augustine reported.[47] The God-man Jesus Christ undertook this commission and saves all who believe in him, inviting them into a "new city" of which he is both king and "founder,"[48] and restoring their original natures, as if by rebirth.[49]

This transformation is not unconditional, according to Christianity. It does not merely set the clock back to some ideal state before Adam's Fall, leaving humanity free to associate (or not) on renewed terms, independent of the God-man who unilaterally created the conditions under which this rapprochement would be possible. Rather, humans must remain existentially subservient to Christ if they hope to recapture their lost organic harmony: "They become his members (*membra*) through grace, and thus Christ is united to them, even as a head with its body," wrote Augustine.[50] Sometimes Christ is described as the Head of this community and sometimes as the Soul[51]—two entities considered either interchangeable, or equally representative of Christ's elevated role within the organism, as the source of life "from whom all the body, nourished and knit together by joints and ligaments, grows."[52] But neither of these functions or faculties are carried over from the ancient organicist tradition; they were developed by Christianity to shift the responsibility for humanity's fellowship to a salvific figure with extraordinary power, rather than entrusting it to the dysfunctional humans themselves. The ancients certainly granted their elites expansive authority to guide, shape, and cultivate concord within the community, but they never implied that elites were to create the community *ex nihil*, so much as persuade individuals to do so themselves or, as is more likely, receive and foster those which were already in existence. Plato perhaps flirted with the notion of elite "sovereignty" over society, with his "philosopher kings" and their cave rescues,[53] but even he insisted that the source of their authority was external to them and beyond their control, located in the "good itself."[54] By and large, the ancients frowned upon centralized or autocratic claims, and attributed society's success to the combined efforts of every virtuous individual within it. Cicero called society "the people's possession,"[55] and believed that elite rulers, established subsequently, should remain forever accountable to the "common body of humanity."[56]

Christianity, in turn, called the church "Christ's possession"[57] and redrew the lines of accountability, from each constitutive member to Christ rather than vice versa, carefully signaling that the collectivity could not even exist independent of Christ's sustenance, let alone check or overthrow him. The rich organic fellowship imagined by the ancients became a reality within the Christian church—but only through the ministrations of an all-powerful creator, savior, and sovereign, who abruptly leveled all existing hierarchies in his wake. Compared to Christ, no elite could claim power or influence over anyone else, and in fact the very categories of superior and inferior could have no place except in reference to Christ and his people. "Sin" and "salvation" became the only relevant categories, neither of which discriminated on the basis of gender, race, class or any other demarcation of social standing. "There is no difference," said Paul. "All have sinned and fall short of the glory of God. . . . But you are all sons of God through faith in Christ Jesus. There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free, there is neither male nor female, for you are all one in Christ Jesus."[58] Differences in personality, background, talents, and responsibilities within the church might stave off sterile uniformity, encourage interdependence among the members, and suggest a soft

economic organization of roles and functions, established to facilitate and promote the efficacy and wellbeing of the whole. But these distinctions were not intended to threaten the radical equality of Christians under Christ, or weaken their sense of universal subjection and dependence upon him.

This equality was spiritual and theological, but its immediate political consequences—even in the church—were less clear. The bishop of Rome quickly claimed "headship" over all other congregations, as Christ's earthly representative, effectively establishing that Christ's spiritual body would be realized *analogically* in the ecclesiastical structure of the church, a determination that persisted unchallenged until the Protestant era. The medieval political tradition, developed in codependence with the church, immediately assimilated the principles of Christian organicism modeled by it, adopting monarchy as the norm and demanding Christological behavior from their kings. "The prince is a kind of likeness on earth of the divine majesty," wrote John of Salisbury. "Loyal shoulders should uphold his power . . . and all the limbs should be in subjection to the head."[59] Even Aquinas, who almost slavishly endorsed Aristotle's political vision, refused to consider any constitution but monarchy: "For where there are many men together and each one is looking after his own interest," he explained, "the multitude would be broken up and scattered unless there were also an agency to take care of what appertains to the common weal." Aquinas insisted that this agency must be "one man," and that "he is to be in the kingdom what the soul is in the body, and what God is in the world," namely the creator and sovereign ruler. Aquinas carefully clarified that the office of "creator" should be understood only metaphorically, to mean "founder" rather than divine inventor, *ex nihil*, for "of course the founder of a city and kingdom cannot produce anew men."[60] But loosely, the medievals upheld and favored the Christian iteration of organicism in their political and ecclesiastical institutions.

And this then was the organicist tradition bequeathed to Hobbes and Rousseau in the early modern era: a sociology of moral collectivism, typified by the metaphor of the living body, and shaped in various ways by two contrasting paradigms, *classical* and *Christian*. Both paradigms asserted that humans are meant to live in symbiotic interdependence, moral and biological. They also agreed that the dysfunction of "self-love" was humanity's most formidable impediment to this goal. But they diverged over the likelihood of humanity attaining it, with the classical tradition fairly optimistic and the Christian tradition in despair. According to classical organicism, humanity could achieve interdependence *naturally* (perhaps with the facilitation and encouragement of especially rational leaders), and envisioned society as an expansive network of overlapping hierarchies and control. According to Christian organicism, humanity had no chance of achieving interdependence unless it be by *supernatural* means, from crisis and confrontation to conversion by one who had the power to perform this transformation and maintain everyone in it. Christianity replaced the classical network of hierarchies with undivided sovereignty, wielded by the community's creator and obeyed by all the rest. Both paradigms were legitimately organicist, but because they diagnosed human nature differently, they also disagreed about the degree of centralized authority necessary to create and sustain the social organism.

Body and Contract

The possibilities and nuances of the organicist tradition were almost certainly known to Hobbes and Rousseau. Both were theologically aware and astute, lived within recent memory of the Middle Ages and, at least in the case of Hobbes, supported monarchs who proudly served as standard-bearers for the Christian/medieval mentality well into the early modern era. "The state of monarchy is the supremest thing upon earth," James I proclaimed to Parliament in 1609:

> Kings are not only God's Lieutenants upon earth, and sit upon God's throne, but even by God himself they are called Gods. For if you will consider the attributes to God, you shall see how they agree in the person of a king. God hath power to create, or destroy, make, or unmake at his pleasure, to give life, or send death, to judge all, and to be judged nor accountable to none. Kings are also compared to fathers of families: for a king is truly *parens patriae*, the politic father of his people. And lastly, kings are compared to the head of this microcosm of the body of man.[61]

This statement is well within the mainstream of the organicist tradition in that it acknowledges a certain moral and biological coherence of the political community. And although it could be regarded as *classically* organicist in its reference to paternalist influence, it conforms more closely to the *Christian* paradigm, in its allusions to sovereign and divine authority. Since Hobbes strongly emphasized all of these characteristics in his work and developed the body metaphor as a leitmotif of his work, it seems safe to assume that he advocated an organicism of the Christian variety, interpreted more or less in keeping with the medieval, analogical tradition of politics.

But interestingly, modern scholars assume the opposite conclusion: that Hobbes actively *rejected* organicism, along with its famous rhetorical tropes. He "had little use for the metaphor of the body politic, and replaced it with a social contract," claimed David Hale, author of a book entitled *The Body Politic*.[62] Even those who acknowledge Hobbes's commitment to the body metaphor attempt either to expose it as a rhetorical façade,[63] or to explain it away as a discordant conceit (probably ill-chosen) that requires careful reinterpretation. Their skepticism about Hobbes's organicism seems to be derived, in large part, from a rather narrow understanding of the organicist mentality: one that largely ignores the Christian contribution and reduces the classical iteration to a stark, unnuanced ideology about spontaneous social evolution. Hanna Pitkin asserted:

> Hobbes is not an organicist. The *Leviathan* does invoke the analogy between the state and the human body, but the *Leviathan* is an extraordinarily complex book whose ingredients are by no means always mutually consistent. It contains also a contract theory based on transfer of rights, one based on obedience and power, a theory of authorization and representation, and a number of other arguments *incompatible with organicism*.[64]

This statement ably demonstrates how confusing the organic mentality has lately become for modern theorists, and the way in which this confusion has affected Hobbes scholarship. If Pitkin had merely argued that the various organic themes of obedience, power, consent, and rights ought to be distinguished from each other conceptually, her statement could not be faulted, but it is not clear why they should be considered categorically *incompatible*. The theme of power and obedience seems almost fundamental to the organic mentality, for example, insofar as it appeals to the natural command of the soul (or mind) over the body to justify various power relationships in society, including that of

master and slave. Plato, Aristotle, Salisbury, and Aquinas all derived their respective power hierarchies from organic principles,[65] and patriarchalism itself has long been recognized as a doctrine of social and political obedience to authorities that are natural, biological, and familial.[66] Robert Filmer, who celebrated this theme in his *Patriarcha* (1680), would probably be very surprised at the suggestion that organicism was incompatible with obedience; he combined them in his work, and praised Hobbes for doing the same in *Leviathan*.[67] But Filmer also expressed frustration and bemusement over the consent-based arguments laced throughout Hobbes's work, which he *did* consider incompatible with organicism—or at least unnecessary. "If, according to the order of nature, [Hobbes] had handled paternal government before that by institution," Filmer explained, "there would have been little liberty left in the subjects of the family to consent to institution of government."[68]

In Filmer's defense, consent was not a prominent feature within *classical* organicism. It sometimes showed up in the context of human dysfunction, as we saw in the previous section,[69] but by and large, the ancients shared Filmer's intuition that formal consent was unnecessary so long as individuals adequately perceived and accepted their natural role in society. Hobbes's insistence upon consent—even within relationships that seem ill-suited to it, such as that of parent and child—implied a profound lack of confidence in either humanity or nature, which might then further imply that he also rejected the central tenets of classical organicism. Hobbes explicitly confirmed this rejection, and so did Rousseau—both of them persistently signaling their divergence by portraying society as "artificial," "conventional," "unnatural," and "alien."[70] Although these terms were common enough in pre-modern discourse about society (and especially *political* society, as we shall see in the next section), they were not usually given the prominence and urgency that Rousseau and Hobbes lent them. It was one thing to speak of consent as a formal acquiescence to a state of affairs that was already occurring informally or was easily commenced. This kind of consent was introduced by the ancients, developed by medieval jurists,[71] and by Erasmus's time, was practically correlated with classical organicism, as a feature perhaps not indispensable but at least advisable: humans should formally agree to nature's dictates and institutionalize them as a reminder for weaker moments.[72]

However, the agreement that Hobbes and Rousseau described was entirely different in that it announced the very *im*possibility of organic unity by nature. If Hobbes and Rousseau had not also persisted in describing society as a living body, we would conclude that they were not organicist at all. But their rhetorical depictions suggest that they merely meant to repudiate certain aspects of organicism while retaining others. This was certainly the approach of Paul and Augustine, who thought that the ancients had given insufficient consideration to human depravity, and if Hobbes and Rousseau were found to have similar concerns, it might indicate that they held a version of organicism that aligned more with the Christian paradigm. Of course one does not need to read far into *Leviathan* to encounter Hobbes's assessment of humanity's "nasty and brutish" state of nature.[73] He was especially fond of contrasting human behavior with that of the bees, because classical organicists tended to recommend bee colonies as prototypes of the "natural society" found among humans.[74] Hobbes rejected this comparison because—unlike humans—the bees are not competitive, envious, hateful, or vicious to each other. "The agreement of these creatures is natural," he concluded, "That of men is by covenant only, which is

artificial; and therefore it is no wonder if there be somewhat else required (besides covenant) to make their agreement constant and lasting, which is a common power to keep them in awe, and to direct their actions to the common benefit."[75]

Humans are so grossly dysfunctional, according to Hobbes, that they quickly discover genuine fellowship is beyond their grasp. They can signal their social aspirations through formal agreements and covenants, but those mechanisms are powerless in and of themselves to neutralize human dysfunction or conjure up an organic harmony comparable to that enjoyed by other species.

Rousseau's assessment of human nature was far more complex, but he largely followed Hobbes's precedent and located the "unnaturalness" of his General Will society far less in the contract itself than in the dysfunction that made it necessary in the first place.[76] Observing that humans invariably become greedy, proud, hateful, and violent when led to interact with each other, Rousseau condemned their behavior as "wicked" and corrupt, rather than an inevitable expression of their nature.[77] He explicitly opposed Hobbes on this matter,[78] who had claimed that human dysfunction is (mostly) a consequence of self-preservation and therefore not to be considered moral or immoral at all.[79] Rousseau agreed with Hobbes that self-preservation is the primary preoccupation of human nature, but he thought Hobbes had ignored the inclination of "pity," which often tempers the violent consequences of self-preservation, and is common to all creatures, including humans.[80] Rousseau also failed to understand why Hobbes assumed an environment of scarcity, in which humans could not avoid competition and war. Rousseau's state of nature was expansive and resource-rich, easily allowing humans to preserve themselves without having to interact much at all.[81] He insisted that humans could have lived indefinitely in this blissful state, but this seems unlikely—not only because of the "singular and fortuitous concatenations of circumstances" that allegedly lured humanity to abandon their subsistence lifestyle, but more significantly, because of human nature itself, which concealed within its ingenuous temperament the germs of its own demise. Humans differ from other animals in two ways, according to Rousseau: they are driven to "perfect" their state, long after necessities require it, and more ominously, they have the power to deviate from the dictates of nature, often to their own detriment.[82] Rousseau admitted that it was these inherent faculties that gradually drew humans out of their original innocence, threw them together socially, and set in motion a precipitous moral decline.

He continued to condemn this corruption as "unnatural," but unless we should regard all biological or moral developments as unnatural simply because they differ from an initial state, it is not clear how Rousseau's claim could stand. Aristotle reasonably suggested that the "nature" of an entity or organism is revealed in its final state—achieved not merely through accidental external circumstances, but by methodic maturation of nascent faculties and potential.[83] Rousseau's account of human corruption seems almost paradigmatic of this process. Perhaps he claimed it was unnatural in order to align his myth more closely with the Christian Edenic fall narrative, or to discourage attitudes of complacence or resignation about inclinations that might be regarded as inevitable. Hobbes, who shared Rousseau's concerns, chose to combat complacency differently, by emphasizing the depth of human depravity rather than its source. Hobbes acknowledged Christianity's Edenic narrative,[84] and in one place even described humanity's original God-given nature as one of innocence and peace,[85] but overall he avoided speculating about it

and preferred to accept humanity's postlapsarian nature as the only relevant one to discuss. Ultimately, Rousseau arrived at a similar conclusion, glumly conceding, "Men are [now] wicked; a sad and constant experience makes proof unnecessary."[86]

So the dispute between Hobbes and Rousseau over human nature likely has more to do with terminological confusion than anything else, and unfortunately it tends to pull scholarly attention away from the core claim of their analysis, upon which they both agreed: that human nature—whether original or evolved—actively fights against itself, simultaneously working both to preserve and also to relentlessly undermine and subvert that preservation.[87] Moreover, the self-destructive tendencies in human nature—born of pride, competition, and fear—always result in antisocial behavior that threatens the species' very existence. Hobbes described these tendencies as "concupiscible" (an old-fashioned term connoting inordinate desires) and denounced humanity's war-of-all-against-all as a "contra-natural dissolution."[88] If initially he had been reluctant to pass moral judgment on inclinations that could not be prevented, Hobbes ultimately declaimed the "hateful condition"[89] of humanity with a bitterness that surpassed even Rousseau's, and for which he is most well-known. In addition to his "nasty, brutish, and short" obloquy,[90] Hobbes frequently insisted that "all men easily acknowledge this state to be evil"[91] and replete with "miseries and horrible calamities."[92] He himself thought it to be "the greatest mischief that can arrive to nature,"[93] and in fact "the greatest evil that can happen in this life."[94] Rousseau kept apace by lamenting humanity's "miserable situation" as a "most horrible state of war" that invariably leaves the species "debased and devastated … brought to the brink of ruin [and] no longer able to turn back."[95]

It is the depth of their consternation over human dysfunction—rather than their commitment to voluntarist consent—that really set Hobbes and Rousseau apart from classical adherents of organicism. The ancients and medievals acknowledged the disruptive influence of human dysfunction, but they generally did not regard it to be so disruptive as to prevent any possibility of functional society. Hobbes and Rousseau either had a keener sense of moral depravity than their predecessors (which seems unlikely),[96] or the unique circumstances of their historical contexts gave them reason to be especially pessimistic about human nature. Macpherson has compellingly argued that Hobbes modeled his state of nature upon the nascent bourgeois market society he observed outside his door in seventeenth-century England,[97] and given Rousseau's persistent complaints about private property, materialism, and "self-love,"[98] it seems likely that the spirit of early-modern capitalism was responsible for his sense of social malaise as well. It was in this era of the struggle for individual rights and freedoms that the metaphor of the body politic began to wane, along with its collectivist ideal for society.[99] For the first time in human history, the ancient principles of social cohesion and unity were being eclipsed, challenged, or quietly retired. The deliberate efforts of Hobbes and Rousseau to preserve and maintain the trope of the body politic—in all its collectivist grandeur—at a time in which everyone else seemed eager to forget it, reveals at once the depths of their dissatisfaction with "new world" norms and their determination to recreate the "old world" ideals despite them.

So while they leaned closer to the Christian paradigm of organicism, they retained elements of the classical paradigm as well, the most surprising of which is a sense of teleology in human society and politics. Hobbes and Rousseau thought that humans had very little choice as to whether they should unite politically, and they described the

individual agreements less as autonomous, voluntarist commitments than sober acknowledgements of moral and organic determinism. Hobbes insisted that the political contract was "directed by dictates of reason,"[100] and "compelled by nature itself,"[101] there being "no other way by which a man [could] secure his life and liberty."[102] Rousseau spoke of the "necessity" of an agreement without which "humankind would perish,"[103] graphically illustrating the premise with an analogy about amputating a limb in order to save the body.[104] These contracts described by Hobbes and Rousseau seem neither rationalistic, arbitrary, nor provisional, as is claimed of liberal contractualism,[105] but are instead wholly determined by the compulsory dictates of nature and virtually impossible to retract.[106] These characteristics are much more in keeping with ancient and medieval assumptions about consent, in which "the necessity of the body politic" (as Hobbes put it)[107] is accepted and received as the only legitimate possibility.

But if formally acknowledging this reality is not the same as creating it, how did Hobbes and Rousseau propose that humans should surmount the obstacle of their entrenched dysfunction? Rousseau wrote:

> While the opposition of particular interests made the establishment of societies necessary, it is the agreement of these same interests that made it possible. What these different interests have in common is what forms the social bond, and if there were not some point on which all interests agree, no society could exist.[108]

In this passage, Rousseau seems to imply that the body politic is created spontaneously in the hearts and minds of individuals, the contract itself simply signaling this transformation without actually effecting it. In other passages, however, he insists that it is the very event of public contract that immediately creates the "moral and collective body" of society, as if *ex nihilo*.[109] Hobbes concurred in this sentiment, dismissing any pre-contract agreement of wills as mere "concord,"[110] envisioning the event as an instantaneous conversion from many wills to one will,[111] and describing the actual contract as a divine fiat, such as the one God delivered to speak the world into existence.[112] Unlike the prosaic liberal pacts that regulate abstract or ephemeral relationships, the contract depicted by Hobbes and Rousseau has extraordinary transformative power and can alter reality itself: "By the social pact we have given the body politic existence and life," proclaimed Rousseau. It is a contract like no other.[113]

This was not the end of the story for Hobbes and Rousseau, any more than church membership solved every problem for St. Paul and St. Augustine. While they all maintained that the event of institution actually effects a new reality, they also accepted that individuals were often involved in a struggle to embrace it fully, due to insufficient moral and rational development or lingering habits from the previous reality. Hobbes had a tremendous amount of faith in brute force and fear as incentives for orderly behavior in the interim,[114] and even Rousseau famously pronounced that wayward citizens would be "forced to be free."[115] But overall Rousseau saw that force, while not inherently incompatible with organic cohesion (as we saw with Filmer, above),[116] could have only a limited purview and would quickly prove destructive to the *esprit de corps* if relied upon exclusively or in too great a measure.[117] Rousseau put greater faith in moral education as the means whereby to grow and enliven the body politic, and warned: "Now to form citizens is not the business of a single day."[118] Ultimately, Hobbes was forced to concede

this point, agreeing that "the grounds of [sovereign] rights have the rather need to be diligently, and truly taught, because they cannot be maintained by any civil law, or terror of legal punishment."[119]

There are simply too many features in the works of Hobbes and Rousseau that align with the Christian or classical principles of organicism to justify interpretations that confidently deny it, especially since it must now be clear that contractual consent is not incompatible with either organicist tradition.[120] The weight of anti-organicist claims about Hobbes has to fall heavily upon his metaphor of the machine, which is often reflexively advanced as proof that he abrogated the organicist mentality, and it is to this allegation that we now turn.

Body and Machine

"Nature," announced Hobbes in the introduction of *Leviathan*, "the art whereby God hath made and governs the world, is by the art of man imitated, that it can make an artificial animal." He continued:

> For seeing life is but a motion of limbs, the beginning whereof is in some principal part within, why may we not say that all *automata* (engines that move themselves by springs and wheels as doth a watch) have an artificial life? For what is the heart, but a spring; and the nerves, but so many strings; and the joints, but so many wheels, giving motion to the whole body, such as was intended by the artificer? Art goes yet further, imitating that rational and most excellent work of nature, man. For by art is created that great Leviathan called a Commonwealth, or State (in Latin *civitas*), which is but an artificial man.[121]

It should be noted that Hobbes is not here saying that the Commonwealth *is* a machine, only that it imitates nature, and so do machines, in their own way—a fine distinction, yet an important one, given the number of scholarly interpretations that rest heavily upon the supposition that he called the Commonwealth a machine. The further presumption that this machine reference contradicts his body metaphor is another thing entirely, and is so firmly established in the scholarly literature that it is difficult to know where, when, or with whom it originated. It is at least as old as Gierke, who expressed bemusement at Hobbes's persistent use of traditional organic metaphors and similes despite his "strict individualistic system." Gierke could only suggest that Hobbes found it worthwhile to retain the older conceits merely to demolish them, by conspicuously "transforming his supposed organism into a mechanism," and his State-personality into a "purely external and formal" artifice. "The analogy of an artificially constructed machine more and more takes the place of the natural body in the interpretation of the social Whole."[122] The problem with this interpretation is that it lacks textual evidence and reads more like a convenient gloss on Hobbes's work—perhaps in support of a preconceived prejudice against him—than a careful or sympathetic explication.

If Hobbes had intended for his machine metaphor in the Introduction to *Leviathan* to negate, subvert, or eclipse his metaphor of the body—along with its collectivist pull—his efforts were clumsy, inadequate, and strangely self-defeating. Ten years prior to *Leviathan*, Hobbes had entitled his first major political work *The Body Politic* (*De Corpore Politico*, 1640) and formally selected the body metaphor as his preferred rhetorical characterization of the commonwealth. Two years later, he tried out a different approach in *De Cive*

(1642), and only sparsely alluded to the body.[123] But in *Leviathan* (1651), Hobbes revived the metaphor and gave it a prominence and depth that far surpassed all his previous works: there are over 70 references to the "body politic" or to some similar human association termed a "body" (*corpus)* in *Leviathan*, along with countless allusions to the "parts organical" of the commonwealth,[124] and an entire chapter devoted to the "infirmities" and "intestine disorders" that may afflict it.[125] As if to reinforce the continuity of his commitment, Hobbes opened his scientific work *De Homine* (1658) with the reminder, "Man is not just a *natural* body, but also a part of the state, or (as I put it) of the *body politic*."[126] Gierke's allegation that Hobbes transformed his body into a machine is simply unsupported by the textual evidence. Hobbes used the machine metaphor only once in all his works, and even then rather obliquely. That it should be taken as the rhetorical hallmark of his philosophy—in contradistinction to the metaphor he persistently preferred—is insufficiently defended or explained in the scholarly literature since Gierke.

The need for explanation becomes all the more pressing when greater scrutiny is applied to the rhetorical choices of Rousseau, who embellished the machine metaphor with gusto, and frequently described the activity of society in terms of mechanical operations. "[The Lawgiver] is the mechanic who invents the machine," he once stated. "The Prince is nothing but the workman who assembles and operates it."[127] Rousseau used the machine motif at least twelve times in his political works[128]—which is admittedly less than he used the organic body metaphor, but still considerably more than Hobbes used it. And despite these overtly mechanistic depictions, Rousseau has largely dodged the reductionist labels that are routinely ascribed to Hobbes, such as materialism, mechanistic rationalism, and individualism. Instead, any aspect of his work emphasizing individualist consent or freedom—not to mention allusions to machines— are smoothly incorporated into a broader interpretive framework that foregrounds his collectivist, moral, and humane concerns.[129] Even Marx, who could barely contain his antipathy toward industrial capitalism, seemed unperturbed by Rousseau's frequent portrayals of a mechanized society. In one of his famous essays he approvingly excerpted from Rousseau's *Social Contract* the passage containing the machine quote cited above, which describes the role of the Lawgiver as someone who "transform[s] each individual . . . into part of a greater whole from which that individual as it were receives his life and being."[130] Marx appealed to this collectivist and organicist sentiment of Rousseau's and rephrased it with his own neologism: "Human emancipation will only be complete when the real, individual man has absorbed into himself the abstract citizen; when as an individual man, in his everyday life, in his work, and in his relationships, he has become a *species-being* [*Gattungswesen*]."[131]

The various metaphors used by Hobbes, Rousseau, and Marx—body, machine, or *species-being*—all seem oriented toward the same sociopolitical desideratum of dynamic unity. They all portray society as one cohesive entity, whose constitutive parts interdependently work toward a common purpose and existence. This larger rhetorical strategy is lost or minimized, however, if the respective metaphors are subjected to literalist scrutiny and ranged against each other. Ultimately, does it really matter whether the machine literally breathes, or the body can be touched, or the *species-being* can be understood as an organism at all? Does it matter which metaphor is selected or preferred? The answer could be yes, provided that the metaphors are openly contrasted rather than used interchangeably. If, for instance, the machine metaphor were to be explicitly

contrasted with that of the body, the differences in connotation might allude to deeper philosophic conflicts between artifice and nature, formality and authenticity, reproduction and creativity, or other similar categorical tensions frequently drawn by recent theorists in order to analyze a certain post-industrial disillusionment with an undue preoccupation with science, technology, and economic production. Then they often stand as a critique of all efforts to translate moral or humanistic values into scientific or mathematical formulas. Hobbes fares badly when subjected to this test, given his famous tendencies to describe the world as a collection of physical bodies and to envision moral philosophy as a mere "adding up" of correct definitions and names[132]—tendencies routinely regarded as conclusive evidence that he was a mechanistic materialist, and therefore incapable of conceiving of society as anything more than a collection of disparate individuals. Rousseau is usually spared the test, which is fortunate for him given that he described society as a machine far more prominently than Hobbes did, and more systematically relied upon mathematical formulas to explain moral principles.[133] Gierke is one of the few scholars who has, with admirable consistency, subjected Rousseau to the same interpretive strictures as Hobbes and found him to be equally guilty of mechanistic materialism and individualism—notwithstanding his conspicuous collectivist claims and moral concerns.[134]

The test itself is unsound, in that humanistic attempts at quantitative methods or allusions are not necessarily indicative of broader ideological commitments to sociological technocracy or materialism. Hobbes's arithmetic claims about reasoning really amount to little more than a plea for greater conceptual precision, and Rousseau's political ratios are merely attempts to express fairly straightforward philosophic principles in mathematic terms. Neither heuristic was strictly necessary or helpful: they did not add anything substantive to the arguments in question that couldn't have been explained just as easily with conventionally philosophic language. But what Hobbes and Rousseau did reveal in their frequent—and often clumsy—mathematic tropes, was an eagerness and enthusiasm for human progress through scientific means. This confidence was quite common of early-modern writers, conscious of being on the cusp of industrial transformation and buoyed by new inventions and discoveries that all but guaranteed significant improvements on all fronts, social, political, economic, and even moral. Hobbes and Rousseau were especially interested in the sciences: they both joined organizations dedicated to science and published various amateur works on mathematics, physics, biology, and chemistry.[135] Their eagerness to re-imagine social phenomena in terms of mathematic ratios, chemical reactions,[136] or mechanized robots merely demonstrates their attempt to update the ancient metaphors and allusions with modern correlates. They did not intend to supplant the old metaphors, far less to reject them.

Hobbes and Rousseau communicated this by smoothly alternating between mathematical and moral arguments, as though they were infinitely compatible, and between organic and mechanical metaphors, as if they were interchangeable. Hobbes interlaced his only mechanistic conceit with so many biological allusions that it was difficult to separate out the body from the machine, or to distinguish them at all. Was the state to be considered a machine or a body? Was indeed a human being to be considered a machine or body? The rhetorical tenor of the passage suggested that the distinction was inconsequential.[137] Rousseau asserted with comparable imprecision, "The body politic can be looked upon as an organized body, alive, and similar to a man's. . . . The

citizens are the body and members that make the machine move, live, and work."[138] His ambiguity about the state's essence also extended to human beings themselves, as it had for Hobbes. "I see in any animal nothing but an ingenious machine to which nature has given senses in order to wind itself up," Rousseau declared. "I perceive precisely the same thing in the human machine."[139] These telling sentiments of Rousseau and Hobbes suggest that at least part of what they intended to imply with their machine metaphors had nothing to do with artifice or human design—neither of which properly applies to nature—but with the discovered comprehensibility of nature's (God-given) eternal modes and laws that govern the universe, which humans flout to their own detriment.[140]

Even those few passages in which Hobbes and Rousseau use the machine metaphor to emphasize artificiality and human agency do so without prejudice or antagonism toward nature. Non-natural political institutions are not described as arbitrary or voluntarist inventions but careful imitations of nature, as if to reinforce the premise argued in the previous section that what is ultimately most unnatural for Hobbes and Rousseau is human dysfunction, not the remedial reconstructions that dutifully imitate the laws formerly flouted. "Nature (the art whereby God hath made and governs the world)," wrote Hobbes, "is by the art of man, as in many other things, so in this also imitated, that it can make an artificial animal,"[141] a declaration that echoes almost verbatim the ancient and medieval mindset on this subject. Salisbury congratulated Cicero and Plato for "laying down the same formula for the existing or proposed body politic, namely that its life should imitate nature, which we have so often called the best guide of life."[142] Hobbes and Rousseau adopted this belief wholeheartedly, privileging the organic laws of nature as normative and enjoining humanity to actively adhere to its tenets, even if doing so might initially seem difficult to creatures accustomed to contrary habits. Rousseau even intimated that humans would never fully be able to achieve what nature effortless accomplishes everyday: "The difference between human art and the works of nature is felt in its effects," he observed.

> Citizens may call themselves members of the state but they cannot join it as true members are joined to the body; it is impossible so to arrange things that each one of them not have an individual and separate existence that enables him to attend to his preservation by himself. The nerves are less sensitive, the muscles less vigorous, all the ties more slack, the least accident can sunder everything.[143]

But rather than abandoning the task as futile or inappropriate, Rousseau urged citizens to quicken their passions and will, thereby to foster cohesion and preserve the fragile organism: "This is the law of conservation which nature establishes among the species," he prompted, "and which preserves them all."[144] Rousseau and Hobbes looked to nature for encouragement and exhorted their readers to do the same, in the tradition of Plato, Cicero, Salisbury, and perhaps more evocatively, in the tradition of Christian organicism, which had a more robust appreciation for the difficulties of corporate cohesion, even after conversion. "There should be no schism in the body," warned Paul. "Let the peace of God rule in your hearts, to which you were called in one body."[145] Augustine pleaded with his readers to aim for the state of social contentment modeled in natural organisms, where "the peaceable structure of the whole body holds all members together."[146]

The rhetorical mood and intent of this religious genre reverberates in the works of Hobbes and Rousseau, and at no point did they indicate that their machine metaphors should be read against it. Rightly or wrongly, they seemed to assume that ever-improving human efforts to simulate natural principles should be regarded as realizations of those principles, however imperfectly executed. The machine metaphor expressed for them the imperfection of the enterprise, while the body metaphor expressed the ideal. Interpretations that contrast the two analogies—as if the machine-like collectivities described by Rousseau and Hobbes represent larger projects or social schemes contrary to natural and organic principles—interpose an anachronistic, postmodern mindset where it does not belong. While they certainly tried to update the relevance of organicism for the early-modern world, both thinkers did their utmost to preserve it. Why they chose to do so lies at the very heart of their political projects.

Body and Soul

The heart of their respective projects is actually a soul. There is perhaps no other concept or entity that Hobbes and Rousseau held more dear than political sovereignty, which they both depicted as the "soul" of the body politic. While they may have used the machine conceit to describe various aspects of the political community at large, they almost never referred to sovereignty itself in any other terms but organic. This preference—exhibited in the most fundamental aspects of their thought—invites us to reconsider and review the unique connotations of the organic conceit in order to assess its relative superiority to the mechanical conceit in the minds of Hobbes and Rousseau. There are at least two such characteristics of the organic metaphor that immediately indicate why it might be considered indispensable to them.

The first such characteristic—and arguably the most important—is life itself, initiated and maintained within the organism by the "soul," which Hobbes and Rousseau correlate with political sovereignty. Complexities about the precise properties of the soul, primarily in Hobbes's work, have sometimes been seized upon by scholars eager to discredit or challenge his persistent organic imagery,[147] which is probably unfair given how difficult it is to analyze or describe the concept properly. Hobbes rather sensibly insisted that the soul should be understood as the extent of "life" in the organism: an elusive, vital force that animates the body.[148] He claimed that he derived this sense from the Bible, and it is certainly within the range of Christian organicist thought, in which Christ's office (or the medieval king's) was portrayed as the living "soul" of the community, just as often as the governing head.[149] Hobbes sometimes referred to his Sovereign as the "head" of the commonwealth, especially when describing his ecclesiastical roles, but he tended to prefer the soul analogy because of its greater organic indispensability, without which the head could not perform its function and shortly would cease even to exist.[150] "The sovereign is the soul of the commonwealth," he declared, "which, once departed from the body, the members do no more receive their motion from it . . . [quickly] dissolving into earth, for want of a soul to hold them together."[151] In depicting political sovereignty as the source and sustainer of existence—or as Rousseau described it, "the principle of life"[152]—both thinkers were alluding to a procreative dynamic within society that the

machine metaphor did not easily capture or convey. The motor of an automaton may break down, but that would hardly cause the machine to disintegrate or cease to exist as an entity.

The generative power of the soul more suggestively evokes the tradition of paternalism, in which a nascent organism is shaped and governed by the life-force that brought it into being. Hobbes and Rousseau actively courted this comparison, not because they were emotionally attached to paternalism—they were in fact wary of it[153]—but because they wished to repurpose certain hallmarks of paternalism as functions of "soulful" sovereignty. Thus they encouraged citizens to submit to political sovereignty in the same way and for the same reasons that the physical members of the body submit themselves to the soul, or children submit themselves to parents: first, for their very existence ("for [children] ought to obey him by whom [they are] preserved"),[154] and secondly, for their proper health and functioning. "Just as nature gives each man absolute power over his members," wrote Rousseau, "the social pact gives the body politic absolute power over all its members, and it is this same power which (directed by the general will) bears the name of sovereignty."[155] Rousseau and Hobbes were quick to describe political sovereignty as "universal, coercive,"[156] and "as great as can be imagined,"[157] yet they were equally keen to portray it as an intelligent authority, constructive and kindly, as any subordinate would expect from a superior so existentially implicated in their plight. "The profit of the sovereign and subject goeth always together … [just as] men love their children, for they are his strength and his honor,"[158] Hobbes explained. "Every sovereign hath the same right, in procuring the safety of his people, than any particular man can have in procuring the safety of his own body."[159] Rousseau tellingly described sovereignty (or the General Will) as both a body and a "fatherland," and he enjoined this authority to behave as "the common mother of the citizens,"[160] protecting and providing for their welfare with as much concern as an organic body might show toward its own members. "It is not credible," he wrote, "that an arm can be injured or cut off and the pain of it not be conveyed to the head; it is no more credible that the General Will agree that one member of the State, regardless of who he may be, injure or destroy another member, than that the fingers of a man in possession of his reason gouge out his eyes."[161] Rousseau and Hobbes turned to these paternal and organic metaphors rather than to those of the machine to explain the moral legitimacy of a political power whose identity, will, and fate is intrinsically bound up in those of citizens, and whose dynamic intelligence flexibly responds to their needs, challenges, and perils.[162] The machine metaphor could not communicate this sense adequately.

The machine metaphor had trouble depicting even something so fundamental as the disparity between sovereignty and subjects—a principle more easily evoked by organicism in its dichotomy of soul over body. As we have seen, Christian organicism in particular drew this disparity so starkly that all other distinctions or inequalities within Christ's church paled in comparison. It is clear that Hobbes had precisely this model in mind when he encouraged his readers to "reverence" the Civil Sovereign as if he were God incarnate. "The inequality of subjects [among themselves] … has no more place in the presence of the Sovereign than in the inequality between kings and their subjects in the presence of the King of Kings."[163] The reference here to Christ—before whom all other hierarchies fall away—reveals Hobbes's debt, not only to Christianity but also to the tradition of medieval monarchy described by Ernst Kantorowicz in his work *The King's*

Two Bodies, in which kings were regarded by their subjects as *christomimetes*, impersonators of Christ.[164] Since Hobbes preferred monarchy to all political forms, the influence of Christian organicism in his work is fairly obvious and literal. It takes a bit more work to uncover the influence in Rousseau, who insisted that sovereignty be democratic so that citizens could be free. Rousseau quietly belies this commitment by granting a "Lawgiver" quasi-divine powers: to create the community, transform individuals into members of a social body, and give them laws that will foster and sustain the organism indefinitely. Rousseau calls this achievement "a miracle … an undertaking beyond human strength," and in his description of the Lawgiver's extra-ordinary role, one can easily draw comparisons to Christ, savior of his people. But even more importantly, the telltale marks of Christian organicism are present in Rousseau's simple dichotomy of "sovereign and subject." Every citizen "finds himself engaged in a double relation," or to put it another way, a double psychology. He is both sovereign and subject; he is both public man and a private man. As "public man" he is a member of the larger social body; as "private man" he identifies with his actual physical body. Rousseau is affirming the medieval concept of the "two bodies" here, but instead of locating it in a king, he located it in every citizen. If anything, the organic relationship of sovereign to subject is even more intimate in Rousseau than in Hobbes, insofar as it occurs within one literal body.

This intimate, organic identification of subject to sovereign, and vice versa, was also shared by all the members of society with each other, and this is the second such social phenomenon described by Hobbes and Rousseau in exclusively organic language. Rousseau, who argued in his *Discourse on Inequality* that "natural pity" was a biological emotion,[165] enlarged its expression in his *Political Economy* and *Social Contract*, depicting society as a living organism made up of citizens who unavoidably participate in each other's pain and pleasure, sickness and health. "As soon as the multitude [of individuals] is united in one body," he wrote, "none of its members can be injured without attacking the body, and still less can the body be injured without the members being affected. Thus duty and interest alike obligate the two contracting parties to help one another."[166] For this organic interrelationship to develop among individuals disinclined to unity of any kind, a specific psychology was necessary, that is, the deliberate privileging of the "public man" over the "private man" in each citizen. "If, for example," Rousseau explained, "they are taught from sufficiently early on never to look upon their individual [self] except in its relations with the body of the state, and to perceive their own existence as, so to speak, only a part of its existence, they will at last succeed in somehow identifying with this larger whole."[167] The successful development of this organic psychology determined, for Rousseau, the fate of legitimate politics, the state, and perhaps humanity itself. He insisted that citizens constantly communicate a "reciprocal sensitivity" to each other: an emotion quite difficult to express or explain except in organic language. "What if this communication should cease," he asked, "the formal unity vanish, and the contiguous parts no longer belong together except by being next to another? The man is dead, or the state is dissolved."[168] The term used here, "dissolved," is the one Hobbes earlier used to describe a decomposing body.[169]

Hobbes tended to express the profound identification of citizens to each other and the sovereign in terms of an organism's biological health, despite occasional internal invasions of sickness and disease. In one evocative chapter of *Leviathan*, he identified several ideas, attitudes, and institutions that were subversive to political sovereignty and

graphically analogized them as "infirmities … resembl[ing] the diseases of a natural body," many of which he regarded as fatal.[170] Although Hobbes was buoyed by the supranatural potential of the body politic to live on indefinitely,[171] he soberly accepted that it was still just as fragile as a natural body—if not more so[172]—and especially prone to an "unnatural conflux of evil humors," often masquerading as healthy internal organs.[173] Rousseau delivered a similar prognosis, bleakly asserting, "The body politic, like the human body, begins to die from the moment of its birth."[174] This unsettling metaphor, redolent of death and decay, was almost certainly designed to arouse within readers subconscious anxieties about their self-preservation. These fears had been stoked already by Rousseau and Hobbes in earlier passages glorifying this biological instinct, amplifying threats against it, and offering political society as the only arena in which individuals could successfully fulfill its mandate.[175] The rhetorical transformation of each citizen into various living organs of political society kept undivided focus on the biological imperative of self-preservation while quietly rechanneling its energies: away from the many "selves" protected by society and toward the great "self" that *was* society.[176]

This brilliant psychological *coup* could not have been effected so persuasively had Hobbes or Rousseau favored the mechanistic metaphor over the organic. A machine that is broken is infinitely less tragic than a human life lost: it has no moral value and is more easily repaired, reconstructed, or replaced. Describing the commonwealth as a mere machine would not have elicited in readers the same subconscious pangs of concern that they reserved for their own physical wellbeing, nor would it have fostered the same sympathetic solicitude for each other that they daily experienced in the inner workings of their own bodies. Mere cogs in a wheel cannot sense pain or pleasure, they are not aware of the whole machine and their place in it, they do not fear the cessation of their movements, or revere their source and inventor. Insofar as these attitudes were of critical importance to Hobbes and Rousseau—as social and political dispositions of deference, obligation, and unity—the organic metaphor was rhetorically indispensable. Ignoring, minimizing, or rejecting the significance of this trope in their works risks undermining (or, in the case of Hobbes, misunderstanding) their most cherished commitments and beliefs.

Final Thoughts

Hobbes and Rousseau tenaciously clung to the metaphor of the body politic at a time in which the ancient analogy had finally lost its luster, and was no longer regarded as timeless but as archaic, quaint, and obsolete.[177] Their resistance to this popular assessment—even on its own—suggests that Hobbes and Rousseau might have identified more strongly with premodern modes of social and political imagination than with modern. Benjamin Constant, who famously distinguished between "ancient" and "modern" liberty, frequently chided Rousseau (and others like him) for "failing to recognize the changes brought by two thousand years in the dispositions of mankind" and clinging naïvely to "ancient views which are no longer valid." Constant explained: "By transposing into our modern age an extent of social power, of collective sovereignty, which belonged to other centuries, this sublime genius, animated by the purest love of liberty, has nevertheless furnished deadly pretexts for more than one kind of tyranny."[178] Rousseau of course made no secret of his love for ancient republicanism and of his ambition to reintroduce premodern institutions and mentalities into modern society.[179] Hobbes tended to regard

the ancients with greater suspicion (or at least those who exhibited proto-democratic tendencies),[180] but he also obliquely praised ancient absolutism, recommended Constantinian imperialism as a model for modern governance, and fixated on competing papal and monarchical claims to sovereignty.[181] There is, in short, something distinctly medieval in Hobbes's orientation and something ancient in Rousseau's, but in an even more powerful way, they were both indebted to the Christian iteration of organicism, for its description of human depravity and its embodied salvation through sovereignty. They were both engaged in conserve-ative projects to resurrect the classical and Christian body politic as an all-encompassing social and political collectivity to which individuals are subjected and subsumed. The various superficial modern nuances they incorporated into this vision—such as scientific ingenuity and contractual consent—were not meant to overwhelm or abrogate it but to enhance and rejuvenate it.

This has long been the standard interpretation of Rousseau's thought, but Hobbes has lately been subjected to a rather selective reading that largely ignores the implications of his body motif, exaggerates his commitment to individualism, and regards him as a proto-advocate of modern liberalism. This article has questioned that reading and shown that Hobbes's rhetorical choices, social concerns, and political aims are more or less equivalent to Rousseau's. Given this, it is not immediately clear why interpretations of Hobbes's thought should not be pulled into closer alignment with Rousseau's, or at least a better explanation be provided for why it should not be (*without* appeals to a machine metaphor that Rousseau employed far more frequently). Like Rousseau, Hobbes had very little reason, socially or politically, to hold individualist, materialist, or mechanistic convictions, and there are many indications that he did not, the body metaphor being chief among them.

Notes

1 John of Salisbury, *Policraticus*, chap. 5; Christine de Pizan, *Book of the Body Politic*.
2 See Plato, *Republic* 2.368d–69a, 4.434d–e; Aristotle, *Politics* 1254a, 1281b, 1290b; Cicero, *Offices* 3.v–vi.
3 For brief synopses of this historical development, see Pitkin, *Concept of Representation*, 246–52; Hale, *Body Politic*, 108–30.
4 For a sample of representative works in this vein, see Gierke, *Political Theories of the Middle Age*, 29–30; Gierke,*Community in Historical Perspective*, 159–62; Tönnies, *Community and Civil Society*; Schmitt, *Roman Catholicism and Political Form*, 12–18.
5 For an alternative assessment of modern society, see Durkheim, *Division of Labor in Society*.
6 See Riley, "Rousseau's General Will," 124–53.
7 See Oakeshott, *Hobbes on Civil Association*, 62: "Hobbes's individualism is far too strong to allow even the briefest appearance of anything like a general will."
8 See Tönnies, *Ferdinand Toennies on Sociology*, 60–61.
9 Bernardi and Bensaude-Vincent, "Presence of Sciences in Rousseau's Trajectory," 70. See also Cohen, *Rousseau*, 33, 64.
10 Gierke, *Development of Political Theory*, 175–76. See also Gierke, *Natural Law and the Theory of Society*, 61, 84, 136.
11 Gierke applauded Tönnies's 1912 work on Hobbes (*Thomas Hobbes der Mann und der Denker*): see Gierke, *Natural Law*, 232 note 18.
12 See Stephen, *Hobbes*; Gierke, *Natural Law*, lxiv–lxvi, lxxiv–lxxiv.
13 See Strauss, *Political Philosophy of Hobbes*, 2, 157; Oakeshott, *Hobbes on Civil Association*, 60–62; Macpherson, *Political Theory of Possessive Individualism*, 1–3, 60–61, 86–87, 93–95.

14 See Plato, *Republic*, 372e, 444d; Aristotle, *The Politics*, 1254a25–b30, 1255b5–15, 1260a1–30, 1277a5–12, 1291a24–27.
15 Cicero, *De Officiis*, 1.25. See also *De Inventione*, 2.56 for "corpus civitatis," the body of the city.
16 Plato, *Republic*, 369b–c.
17 Aristotle, *The Politics*, 1252a24.
18 See Ibid., 1252b15–39, 1278b15–29; Cicero, *De Re Publica*, 1.26.39.
19 Aristotle, *The Politics*, 1253a1.
20 Ibid., 1252a17, 1290b21.
21 Ibid., 1255b9, 1261a22, 1277a5; See also Plato, *Republic*, 462d: "What about the city that is most like a single person? For example, when one of us hurts his finger, the entire organism that binds body and soul together into a single system under the ruling part within it is aware of this, and the whole feels the pain together with the part that suffers. That's why we say that the man has a pain in his finger. And the same can be said about any part of a man, with regard either to the pain it suffers or to the pleasure it experiences when it finds relief. . . . The city with the best government is most like such a person."
22 Plato, *Republic*, 444a–e, 445d; Aristotle, *The Politics*, 1252a24–1252b14, 1253b1–1254b40, 1260a1, 1277a5, 1291a22. Less frequently, hierarchy in nature would be demonstrated through musical principles, as in the harmonization of "lowest, highest, and middle notes." See Plato, *Republic*, 443d; Aristotle, *The Politics*, 1254a28.
23 Aristotle, *Politics*, 1253a15.
24 Ibid., 1253a30.
25 For the tropes of health and sickness, see Plato, *Republic*, 372e, 444c–45, 583–84.
26 For the cave analogy, see Plato, *Republic*, 514–17. For the implausibility of reform and proposal for children, see 496 and 540–41.
27 See ibid., 386a, 389b, 414c–415.
28 Cicero, *De Inventione*, 1.2.
29 See Cicero, *De Officiis*, 1.16.50; Cicero, *De Re Publica*, 1.25.40: "In a short time a scattered and wandering multitude had become a body of citizens by mutual agreement (*concordia civitas facta erat*)."
30 Cicero, *De Officiis*, 3.5–6.
31 Augustine, *City of God*, vol. 4, 12.22. Note the similarity to Plato's noble lie. Cf. Genesis 2:22–24.
32 Augustine, C*ity of God*, vol. 4, 12.23; see also ibid., 14.1.
33 See Augustine, *City of God*, vol. 1, 5.9; and vol. 4, 11.17, 14.13, 19.12: "For no creature's vice is so completely at odds with nature that it destroys the very last traces of nature."
34 Augustine, *City of God*, vol. 4, 13.3, 14.12.
35 Ibid., vol. 1, 2.21. He appropriated Cicero's own analogy of the republic as a painting, whose colors fade over time if not carefully preserved, cf. Cicero, *De Re Publica*, 5.1.
36 Augustine, *City of God*, vol. 6, 19.23–25.
37 Ibid., 19.21; Cf. Cicero, *De Re Publica*, 1.25: "A people is not any collection of human beings brought together in any sort of way, but an assemblage of people in large numbers associated in an agreement with respect to justice and a partnership for the common good."
38 See Augustine, *City of God*, vol. 6, 1.30, 3.25, 19.7, 12.
39 Ibid.,19.21; see also 19.23.
40 Ibid., vol. 6, 22.24, and also 19.13; and vol. 3, 10.6.
41 Ibid., vol. 4, 15.3; vol. 7, 22.30.
42 Romans 12:4ff, I Corinthians 12:16 (New King James Version)
43 I Corinthians 12:14, 19, 21.
44 Romans 12:3, 9–10; I Corinthians 12:21–26; Ephesians 4:1–5; Colossians 2:8, 18–19, 3:11–15.
45 Augustine explicitly approved of their mentality, see *City of God*, vol. 6, 19.5. And for similar appeals to the authority of the ancients on this matter, see Salisbury, *Policraticus*, 5.1–2, 6.21; Aquinas, *On Kingship, to the King of Cyprus*, 1.1, 2.3.
46 See Romans 1:18–2:29, 3:9–23, 6:3–8:23; Galatians 5:16–24; Ephesians 2:1–10; Colossians 2:10–14, 3:1–11; and Augustine, *City of God*, vol. 4, 14.1–4, 11–13, 15, 20, 23–24; 15.5–7, 12; vol. 6, 19.15.

47 Augustine, *City of God*, vol. 4, 14.11 (emphasis added). See also vol. 7, 21.8: "No difficulty will detain him, no law of nature circumscribe him."
48 "*Civitatem Dei, cuius rex est et conditor Christus*," see Augustine, *City of God*, vol. 5, 17.4.
49 "Regeneration" is another theological term for this transformation: see Augustine, *City of God*, vol. 4, 15.1; see also II Corinthians 5:17 and Galatians 6:15.
50 Augustine, *City of God*, vol. 4, 13.23. See also vol. 3, 10.6; 17.4, 9, 20; and *City of God*, vol. 7, 22.18, where Augustine quotes Paul extensively: "Here is described the perfect man (*vir perfectus*)—the Head and the body which consists of all the members whose number will be made up at the proper time."
51 See Augustine, *On Christian Combat*, chap. 20.
52 Colossians 2:19, see also I Corinthians 12:12–13, 27, Ephesians 4:4–6, 15–16, 5:29–30, Colossians 3:15.
53 Plato, *Republic*, 514a–5520, 473d, see also 463b for Plato's description of the philosophers as "saviors" (in Greek, *soteres*, the word used for Christ). Perhaps it is no coincidence that Plato's thought was often considered especially compatible with Christianity, philosophically and rhetorically.
54 Ibid., 445e, 500c–d, 506a–b, 508b–9.
55 Cicero, *De Re Publica*, 1.25, "*res populi*."
56 Cicero, *De Officiis*, 3.6, "*a communi tamquam humanitatis corpore*." See also 1.25.
57 *Augustine, City of God*, vol. 5,*17.20, "Christo et possessione eius ecclesia*."
58 Romans 3:21–23, Galatians 3:28. See also Romans 3:9, Galatians 2:6, and Colossians 3:11–15.
59 Salisbury, *Policraticus*, 5.1, 6.25.
60 Aquinas, *On Kingship*, 1.1–2, 2.1–3; see also *Collected Works*, 3.81.
61 James I, "Speech to the Lords and Commons," 307–8.
62 Hale, *Body Politic*, 127, see also 130, where he claims that Hobbes tried to "put an end to sustained or serious use of organic imagery in political discussion."
63 This angle is a relatively recent phenomenon in the secondary literature, and it tends to claim that Hobbes intentionally used his body metaphor to conceal, undermine, or subvert his transparently-stated aims: to urge closer identification between sovereign and citizens, and to emphasize the sovereign's existential indispensability vis-à-vis the commonwealth. Without addressing the complex rationale of this claim (which deserves its own essay), this article assumes and demonstrates that Hobbes *and* Rousseau used their rhetorical metaphors in the traditional manner, to illuminate and describe their rational premises rather than undermine or contradict them. For examples of the latter argument, see Garsten, "Religion and Representation in Hobbes," 539–41; Abizadeh, "Representation of Hobbesian Sovereignty," 49; Hequembourg, "Hobbes's Leviathan: A Tale of Two Bodies," 21–36; Kahn, *The Future of Illusion*, 37. For a recent article that assumes the opposite, see Smith, "Democracy and the Body Politic," 167–96.
64 Pitkin, "Comment on Orwin," 45 (emphasis added). For another example of this general mentality, see Vieira, *Elements of Representation in Hobbes*.
65 See Plato, *Republic*, 4.441c–445e, 5.473d–e; Aristotle, *The Politics*, 1.ii–vii, 1.xii–xiii, 3.iv; Salisbury, *Policraticus*, 4.1, V.2,9, 6.21; Aquinas, *On Kingship*, bk. 1, chap. 1.
66 For a modern iteration, see Tönnies, *Community and Civil Society*, esp. 24–27, 30–34, 160–61, 193–95, 227–29.
67 Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 20. See also *De Corpore Politico*, 23; *De Cive*, 9.
68 Filmer, "Observations Concerning the Original of Government," 239.
69 See notes 5–7 above.
70 For a sampling, see Hobbes, *Human Nature*, 19.5; *De Cive*, 5.5; *Leviathan*, Introduction.17.2, 24.13; Rousseau: *Social Contract*, 1.1.2, 3.1.21; *Discourse on Political Economy*, par. 3; *Principles of the Right of War*, pars. 24–26, 29, 32, 51.
71 Gierke claims that medieval and Catholic Natural Law theorists virtually invented the notion of modern consent, see Gierke, *Political Theory*, 91–42. Marsilius of Padua emphasized consent as the litmus for legitimate rule, and he explicitly appealed to Aristotle for this principle in *The Defender of the Peace*, 1.8.3, 1.9.2, 5–9.

72 See Erasmus, *Education of a Christian Prince*,17, 39, 43, 89, 105.
73 Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 13.
74 See Aristotle, *The Politics*, 1.2.1253a7–9; Aristotle, "History of Animals," 1.1.488a8–10; Cicero, *De Officiis*, 1.44.157; Salisbury, *Policraticus*, 5.21.
75 Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 17.6–12. See also *Human Nature*, 19.5; *De Cive*, 5.5.
76 Rousseau, *Discourse on the Origin and the Foundations of Inequality*, 2.57; see also 2.18.
77 Rousseau, *Social Contract*, pars. 2–5; see also 1.4.8.
78 Rousseau, *Discourse on Inequality*, 1.34; Rousseau, *Right of War*, pars. 5, 17.
79 The "war of all against all" seems provoked primarily by the collision of humans pursuing their self-preservation within an environment of relative scarcity. But Hobbes describes a certain subset of humans—the "vainglorious"—whose aggression cannot be justified on these grounds, and who perhaps deserve some degree of moral disapprobation. See *Leviathan*, 6.39, 41, 8.18, 11.11–12, 15.19, 27.13–17, 42.25.
80 Rousseau, *Discourse on Inequality*, 1.34–38.
81 See ibid., 1.20–21.
82 Ibid., 1.14–16.
83 Aristotle, *Politics*, 1252b32.
84 Hobbes, *De Corpore*, 6.11; Hobbes, *De Homine*, 10.2; Hobbes, *De Cive*, 16.2, 18.2; Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 4.1–2, 34.25, 35.3, 38.2–3, 44.14, 25, 27–28.
85 Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 38.15.
86 Rousseau, *Discourse on Inequality*, 1.16 [note 9.2].
87 Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 13.3–4, 14.4, .17; Rousseau, *Discourse on Inequality*, 1.14–18, 2.29–32.
88 Hobbes, *De Cive*, Letter Dedicatory.
89 Hobbes, Preface.
90 Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 13.9; see also *De Cive*, 1.12–13.
91 Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 3.31; see also 1.12–13, 15.38–40, 26.13.
92 Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 18.20; see also 20.18.
93 Hobbes, *De Cive*, Letter Dedicatory.
94 Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 30.3.
95 Rousseau, *Discourse on Inequality*, 2.29–30.
96 To claim that Plato, Aristotle, Polybius, and Cicero (especially in *Inventione*) did not fully understand human dysfunction seems unfair to them. It seems even more absurd to claim this of Augustine, John of Salisbury, Aquinas, John of Paris, or Marsilius of Padua (who all persisted in affirming the natural sociality of humans).
97 Macpherson, *Political Theory of Possessive Individualism*, 9–106, 265, 268–70.
98 Rousseau, *Discourse on Inequality*, 2.1, 6, 11, 17, 19, 22–9, 35–42; Rousseau, *Political Economy*, pars. 34–5, 43–44; Rousseau, *Social Contract*, 1.4.8, 8.2, 9 (entire); Rousseau, *Right of War*, pars. 9, 16, 27.
99 See Hale, *Body Politic*, 108–37.
100 Hobbes, *De Corpore Politico*, 20.1; see also *Leviathan*, 13.13–14.
101 Hobbes, *De Cive*, from the Preface; see also the Letter Dedicatory for the "absolute necessity" of the contract.
102 Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 11.9; see also 1.12–3, 15.35, 38, 40, 17.1, 26.13; and *De Cive*, 2.3.
103 Rousseau, *Discourse on Inequality*, 2.50; see also 2.34; *Social Contract*, 1.6.1–2.
104 Rousseau, *Discourse on Inequality*, 2.32.
105 For an excellent description of this mentality versus the alternative, see Tönnies, *Community and Civil Society*, 136, 138–40, 151.
106 See Rousseau, *Social Contract*, 1.7.3.
107 Chapter heading XIX from *Human Nature*.
108 Rousseau, *Social Contract*, 2.1.1.
109 Rousseau, 1.6.8–9; see also 2.6.1.
110 See Hobbes, *Human Nature*, 19.4, 6; *De Corpore Politico*, 21.11, 227.7; *De Cive*, 5.4, 6; *Leviathan*, 17.2–5.
111 Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 17.13; see also *De Corpore Politico*, 20.2–3; *De Cive*, 6 (note).

112 Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Introduction.1; see also *De Corpore Politico*, 20.1.
113 Rousseau, *Social Contract*, 2.6.1; see also 3.16.7.
114 Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 14.2 note 7, 18, 31, 17.6ff., 21.6, and 17.2.
115 Rousseau, *Social Contract*, 1.7.8; see also *Political Economy*, pars. 20–21, 24, 27–28.
116 For statements in support of paternalist political power, see Rousseau, *Political Economy*, pars. 6, 37.
117 Rousseau, *Social Contract*, 1.3, 5; *Political Economy*, par. 22 and see also par. 31.
118 Rousseau, *Political Economy*, par. 36, see also pars. 24, 29.
119 Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 30.4.
120 For an interpretation that acknowledges this, see Voegelin, *New Science of Politics*, 182–84: "The acumen of Hobbes shows itself at its best in his understanding that the contractual symbolism which he uses, in accordance with the conventions of the seventeenth century, is not the essence of the matter. The combining into a commonwealth under a sovereign may express itself in legal form, but essentially it is a psychological transformation of the combining persons." See also Maitland, *State, Trust, and Corporation*, 35.
121 Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Introduction.1.
122 Gierke, *Natural Law*, 52, 61, 136.
123 See Hobbes, *De Cive*, 5.10, "corpus sodalitatis," and also 6.19 and 12.1.
124 Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 23.1; see also the entirety of 22 and 23, and 24.1, 11, 13–14.
125 Ibid., 29; see also Hobbes, *De Corpore Politico*, 27; and *De Cive*, 12.1.
126 Hobbes, *De Homine*, Letter Dedicatory.
127 Rousseau, *Social Contract*, 2.7.2.
128 See ibid., 2.7.2, 3.4.3, 3.10.1, 4, 4.l.1; Rousseau, *Political Economy*, par. 10; Rousseau, *Considerations on the Government of Poland*, 15.5, 7.
129 See Gourevitch, "The Religious Thought," 213.
130 Rousseau, *Social Contract*, 2.7.2–3.
131 Marx, "On the Jewish Question," 46.
132 See Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 5.1–4; *De Corpore*, 1.2–3; *De Homine*, 10.3–5.
133 See Rousseau, *Social Contract*, 2.3.2–3, 2.10.1–2, 3.1.10–16, 3.3.7–8, 3.6.6, 3.9.4, 4.2.10–11.
134 Gierke, *Natural Law*, 112, 136, 306 (note 107); Gierke, *Political Theory*, 109–10, 132 (note 104), 182: "Rousseau makes the contract of union produce a social body vested with power over its members, which despite its artificial existence he often compares to the human body. . . . He works out his 'individualistic collectivism' all the more rigidly. . . . Rousseau's sovereign State-personality remains nothing but the sum of the individuals present at any given moment."
135 See Sorell, ed., *Cambridge Companion to Hobbes*, 45–61, 86–156; Bernardi and Bensaude-Vincent, "The Sciences in Rousseau's Works."
136 Rousseau, *Genevan Manuscript*, 1.2.9.
137 Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Introduction.1.
138 Rousseau, *Political Economy*, par. 10.
139 Rousseau, *Discourse on Inequality*, 1.14–15; see also *Preface to Narcissus*, par. 23.
140 See Bobbio, *Thomas Hobbes*, 36; and for an excellent synopsis of this early-modern mentality, see Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, 97–102.
141 Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Introduction.1.
142 Salisbury, *Policraticus*, 6.21.
143 Rousseau, *Right of War*, pars. 32–34.
144 Ibid.
145 I Corinthians 12:25, Colossians 3:15
146 Augustine, *City of God*, vol.7, 22.30.
147 See Shklar, *Men and Citizens*, 200–209; Hequembourg, "Tale of Two Bodies"; Robin Douglass, "Body Politic," 139. Gierke also frequently cited Hobbes's "soul" of the commonwealth (without commentary), as if it were self-evident proof of his rationalism. See Gierke, *Natural Law*, 61; Gierke, *Political Theory*, 176.
148 Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Latin Appendix, I.45–6, 55–6; see also Introduction.1, 6.1, 34.10, 38.4, 44.15.

149 See notes 55 and 64 above.
150 Hobbes, *De Cive*, 5.19. Rousseau in one instance followed the older usage, referring to sovereignty as the 'head' of the body politic, but he generally preferred the soul allusion as well: see *Social Contract*, 3.1.4; cf. Hobbes, *Political Economy*, par. 10.
151 Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 21.21, 42.125; see also 26.15, 29.23.
152 Rousseau, *Social Contract*, 3.11.3.
153 See Hobbes, *De Corpore Politico*, 24.3; Hobbes, *De Cive*, 10.3. See Rousseau, *Political Economy*, pars. 1–3, 6–7; Rousseau, *Social Contract*, 1.2.2–3, 1.4.5. Rousseau is most concerned about paternalism in a governmental 'chief,' not in the sovereign General Will; see *Political Economy*, par. 8; Rousseau, *Social Contract*, 1.5.1–2.
154 Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 20.5; see also 20.13–5, 30.11.
155 Rousseau, *Social Contract*, 24.1–2.
156 Ibid., 2.4.1.
157 Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 20.18.
158 Ibid., 24.1; see also 30.21; and, *De Cive*, 10.2,5.
159 Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 30.30; see also 17.6 and 24.7.
160 Rousseau, *Political Economy*, pars. 34–41. See also Rousseau, *Leviathan*, 30.1.
161 Rousseau, *Political Economy*, pars. 31–32. See also *Social Contract*, 1.6.5.
162 Constant highlighted this dynamic in Rousseau and in Molé (whom he claimed was following Hobbes): "In the same way as Rousseau maintains that the social body could not harm either the whole of its members or any of them in particular, this writer claims that the holder of power – the man constituted as society – cannot harm society itself, because any injury he caused to it he would suffer fully himself, since he himself *is* society." (Constant, "The Liberty of the Ancients," 106 note 1). And for the relationship between all three thinkers, see Constant, *Principles of Politics*, 21–24.
163 Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 30.16; see also pars. 8–10 and 18.19.
164 See Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies*, 46–49.
165 Rousseau, *Discourse on Inequality*, pars. 34–37.
166 Rousseau, *Social Contract*, 1.7.4; see also 2.4.5.
167 Rousseau, *Political Economy*, par. 36; see also par. 11.
168 Ibid., par. 11.
169 See note 95 above. See also Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 30.7. And for a parallel passage in Rousseau, see *Social Contract*, 2.2.2.
170 Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 29.1–2ff. For similar passages in Rousseau, see *Social Contract*, 2.9.3, 3.1.2, 3.4.7, 3.10.1, 3.11.2, 4.4.36, 4.8.8; and *Political Economy*, pars. 48–49.
171 Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 21.21, 24.1. See also Rousseau, *Social Contract*, 3.11.2.
172 See Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 17.12; Rousseau, *Right of War*, pars. 32–34.
173 Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 22.34. See also Rousseau, *Political Economy*, par. 16.
174 Rousseau, *Social Contract*, 3.11.3; see also 3.10.1.
175 See ibid., 1.6.1, 2.5.1–2.
176 Ibid., 4.1.1; see also 2.4.1.
177 Traditionalist monarchs (such as the British Stuarts) were among the few who continued to use the organic political analogy extensively, which only accelerated the growing sense that it was passé.
178 Constant, "Liberty of Ancients and Moderns," 317–19.
179 See Rousseau, *Social Contract*, 4.3.10–4.7.8, 4.7.27.
180 See Hobbes, *De Cive*, 12.3; *Leviathan*, 21.8–9, 29.14, 31.41 (OL).
181 Much of this sense is delivered in the second half of *Leviathan*. But see 29.4, 42 (entire), 46.23 (OL), 47.21–22.

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